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Abstract
Recent discussions of animal communication and the evolution of language have 
advocated adopting a ‘pragmatics-first’ approach, according to which “a more pro-
ductive framework” for primate communication research should be “pragmatics, 
the field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the meaning of 
linguistic utterances” (Wheeler and Fischer, Evol Anthropol 21:195–205, 2012: 
203). After distinguishing two different conceptions of pragmatics that advocates 
of the pragmatics-first approach have implicitly relied on (one Carnapian, the other 
Gricean), I argue that neither conception adequately serves the purposes of prag-
matics-first approaches to the origins of human linguistic communication. My main 
aim in this paper is to motivate–and begin to articulate–an intermediary concep-
tion whose scope is narrower than Carnapian pragmatics but broader than Gricean 
pragmatics. To do so, I first spell out what I take to be the key insight offered by 
proponents of the Gricean approach concerning the emergence of linguistic com-
munication, namely, its being communication ‘from a psychological point of view’ 
(Tomasello, Origins of human communication, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2008). 
I then develop this insight using key elements from the anti-Gricean ‘biosemantic’ 
account of linguistic communication due to Ruth Millikan (Millikan, Language, 
thought, and other biological categories: New foundations for realism, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1984, Millikan, Tomberlin (ed), Philosophical Perspectives 9, Rid-
geview Publishing, Atascedero CA, 1995, Millikan R (2006) Varieties of Meaning. 
Mass.: The MIT Press (paperback edition), Cambridge, Millikan, Beyond concepts: 
unicepts, language, and natural information, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 
2017, and elsewhere). I argue that the intermediary pragmatics-first approach that 
I propose, which draws on both Gricean and Millikanian resources, would be bet-
ter equipped to serve the purposes of those who search for potential precursors of 
human linguistic communication in animal communication.
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Recent discussions of animal communication and the evolution of language have 
advocated adopting a ‘pragmatics-first’ approach. The general idea behind this 
approach is that pragmatic phenomena are key to understanding certain continuities 
between animal and linguistic communication, and can thus aid our understanding of 
the emergence of human linguistic communication. In this spirit, Arnold & Zuber-
bühler recommend adopting “a pragmatics approach to exploring how primates 
extract information from … highly ambiguous, though discrete, signals” (2013: 2). 
And Seyfarth & Cheney (2017) likewise propose that “animal communication con-
stitutes a rich pragmatic system” and that “the ubiquity of pragmatics, combined 
with the relative scarcity of semantics and syntax, suggest that, as language evolved, 
semantics and syntax were built upon a foundation of sophisticated pragmatic infer-
ence” (p. 340, emphases added). Relatedly, these (and other) authors propose a shift 
in perspective in the study of the evolution of language. Instead of looking from the 
start for the origins of human language–understood as a syntactically and seman-
tically combinatorial, recursive system of discrete symbolic elements–we should 
begin by looking for the origins of human linguistic communication. This shift in 
focus is thought to allow us to recognize certain continuities in use–between what 
humans do with words and what nonhuman animals do with their communicative 
signals (‘nonwords’). Such continuities may exist alongside the admittedly deep syn-
tactic and semantic differences between human languages and animal communica-
tion systems. Hence ‘pragmatics first’.
However, if we are to adopt a pragmatics-first approach as these authors rec-
ommend, we need a clearer understanding of which aspects of animal commu-
nication should count as pragmatic. I begin–in Sect.  Pragmatics: Carnapian, 
Gricean, and ‘Intermediary’–by distinguishing two different conceptions of prag-
matics that advocates of the pragmatics-first approach have implicitly relied on: 
one Carnapian, the other Gricean. I explain why Carnapian pragmatics sets the 
explanatory bar too low for pragmatics-first approaches, whereas Gricean prag-
matics sets the bar too high. This motivates a need for developing an intermedi-
ary pragmatics that would apply less indiscriminately than Carnapian pragmat-
ics yet more broadly than Gricean pragmatics. In Sect.  Intermediary pragmatics 
and communication ‘from a psychological point of view’–pressing from above, 
as it were–I spell out what I take to be a key insight concerning linguistic com-
munication and its emergence as it occurs in the work of a leading proponent of 
the Gricean approach, Michael Tomasello. In Sect. Intermediary pragmatics and 
biosemantics–pressing from below–I argue that this Gricean insight ought to be 
acknowledged by a view of communication which is Carnapian on its face: Ruth 
Millikan’s biosemantics. Combining the Gricean insight with elements from Mil-
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pragmatics. In Sect. Intermediary pragmatics: how to do things with nonwords, I 
explain how this intermediary conception could better serve the purposes of those 
who look for potentially significant precursors of human linguistic communica-
tion in animals’ communicative behaviors. Along the way, I offer some possible 
illustrations from animal communication. I leave it for further empirical inves-
tigation to settle which forms of animal communication actually fall under the 
scope of intermediary pragmatics as characterized here.
Pragmatics: Carnapian, Gricean, and ‘Intermediary’
In their (2012), Wheeler & Fischer advocate looking for “continuities … between 
the communication systems of humans and our extant primate relatives” in “the 
flexible, learned responses of receivers”, since these presumably reveal capacities 
for contextual derivation of call contents (2012: 199). They therefore suggest that “a 
more productive framework” for primate communication research should be “prag-
matics, the field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the mean-
ing of linguistic utterances” (2012: 2030). Likewise, Seyfarth & Cheney suggest we 
should turn to “sophisticated pragmatic inference” as the “foundation” upon which 
language was built (2017: 340). These authors’ focus on ‘pragmatic inferences’ on 
the part of, specifically, the receivers of signals–and the kind of examples from pri-
mate communication that they appeal to–suggest that they are implicitly relying on a 
rather broad conception of pragmatics. On this conception, arguably found in Rudolf 
Carnap (1942) (see Bar-On & Moore 2018, Arnold & Bar-On 2020), pragmatics 
covers indiscriminately any phenomenon involving the use of contextual factors 
of whatever sort to derive the semantic content or significance of an utterance or 
signal.
Carnapian pragmatics
The study of the variation of the content of signal types with the context of 
production and its context-dependent apprehension by interpreters.
Carnapian pragmatics thus characterized covers a great variety of cases in which 
a signal or utterance requires fixing some contextual parameter–e.g. time, place, 
identity (or producer or receiver)–in order to receive a determinate interpretation. 
Carnapian pragmatics was initially introduced to accommodate the ‘indexical’ 
context-dependence of truth-conditions of natural language sentences such as “It’s 
snowing”, or “You are late”, and later extended to accommodate the context-depend-
ence of many other types of linguistic expressions (proper names, definite descrip-
tions, adjectives, possessives, etc.).1 But Carnapian pragmatics can be readily seen 
to cover a host of animal signals: various vocalizations by non-primates (birds, prai-
rie dogs, and suricats, among others), as well as bee dances, cicadas’ mating ‘songs’, 
firefly mating flashes, octopus color changes, and so on (see Fitch 2010: Ch. 4 for a 
relevant survey). In the case of animal signals, Carnapian context-dependence has 
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predominantly to do with the fact that they are produced and received by particular 
individuals, at particular times, in particular places. So, for example, a baboon social 
grunt is issued and received in a specific situation by baboons of a certain relative 
social ‘rank’ and gender (Seyfarth & Cheney 2017). And a bee dance signals to 
observer bees the presence of nectar at a specific direction and distance from where 
the dance is performed (among other things).
However, the capacity for this type of ‘indexical’–or ‘narrow’–context-dependent 
interpretation (Recanati 2002) is not only widely shared across animal species; it 
is also manifested in animals’ derivation of information from non-communicative 
signs. All signs–including so-called ‘natural’ signs–have content whose interpreta-
tion is keyed to the context in which they occur. Tree rings indicate the age of this 
tree at a given time; racoon tracks will signify the recent presence of a (certain spe-
cies of) racoon at a particular point in a path; and certain kinds of red spots signify a 
measles infection afflicting a particular individual at a specific time; and so on. The 
use of such signs to derive information about the environment requires an ability 
for context-dependent interpretation.2 Granted, this marks some continuity between 
humans’ use of linguistic signs and animals’ use of signals, but this continuity seems 
hardly sufficient by itself to illuminate the origins of distinctively linguistic com-
munication. For, e.g., monkey call interpretation to count as relevant to these origins 
it would have to be shown that it goes beyond the narrow kind characteristic of all 
animal interpretation.3
It is telling that accounts that highlight flexible sensitivity to context in, say, 
insect signals (e.g. Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Oller & Griebel 2008) also typ-
ically note crucial differences between insect (as well as nonhuman primate) and 
human communication. Key among these are differences pertaining to the psychol-
ogy underlying linguistic interpretation (see e.g. Maynard Smith & Harper 2003: 
Ch.7 and Fitch 2010). Carnapian pragmatic analyses appear to be, by design, silent 
on the issue of underlying psychology. Their focus is on generating correct contex-
tual mappings between signal types and the circumstances in which signal tokens 
are produced. It is consistent with a given Carnapian analysis of, e.g., monkey calls 
that call users ‘compute’ the context-dependent content of calls as though they were 
merely natural signs of some threat. This suggests that a purely Carnapian analysis 
of a form of communication can at best provide a starting point for a pragmatics-first 
approach. Arguably, any such analysis ought to be supplemented with an account 
of potentially relevant continuities in underlying psychology between the analyzed 
form of communication and human linguistic communication.4
Emphasis on the underlying psychology of communication is very much at the 
heart of a much more restrictive conception of pragmatics due to Paul Grice (1957). 
As is well known, Grice distinguished sharply between ‘natural’ and ‘nonnatural’ 
meaning. Natural signs, such as dark clouds, or rings on a tree trunk, or deer tracks, 
possess (only) natural meaning. Natural meaning is ‘factive’; nonnatural meaning 
2 For an illuminating discussion, see Millikan, e.g. (1984: 39–49,116–117); (1995: 190); (2017: Ch. 11).
3 As explained in Bar-On (under review), the proponents ought to give some evidence that primate call 
interpreters are sensitive to at least some aspects of ‘wide’ context (as understood in Recanati 2002).
4 Bar-On (under review) develops this argument in connection with the formal semantic-pragmatic anal-
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is not. Whereas it is not possible for the rings on a tree to mean that the tree is 
300 years old unless that is the tree’s age, it is possible for three rings on a bus to 
mean that the bus is full, even if the bus is not full. Relatedly, unlike natural signs, 
signs with nonnatural meaning are intentionally issued by minded agents with a spe-
cial kind of ‘reflexive’ intention that constitutes ‘speaker meaning’: “[t]o say that 
[a speaker] S meant something by U is to say that S intended the utterance of U to 
produce some effect in an audience by means of the audience’s recognition of this 
very intention” (Grice 1968: 46, emphasis added).5 On a strictly Gricean conception 
of pragmatics, (properly) pragmatic phenomena include only utterances produced 
with speaker meaning and interpreted as such. But even ‘post-Gricean’ accounts 
of linguistic communication, which relax the strict conception, adhere to the core 
Gricean idea human communication is distinctively ‘ostensive-inferential’.6 Even 
on post-Gricean views, the hallmark of human communication is the rational pro-
duction of an utterance by a speaker who intends “to make evident to an addressee 
the intention to make some thought(s) manifest to [them]” (Carston 2015: 454). So 
speakers overtly provide clues to enable their hearers to derive the specific contex-
tual meanings the speakers have in mind, relying on hearers’ ability to ‘read their 
mind’. Gricean pragmatics as understood here has all and only forms of ostensive-
inferential communication in its scope.
Gricean pragmatics
The study of rationally evaluable communicative utterances issued by produc-
ers ostensively (or “overtly”) and interpreted as such by their ‘mindreading’ 
interpreters.
Gricean pragmatics covers a much narrower range of phenomena than does Car-
napian pragmatics, since it is only applicable to interactions involving ostensive-
inferential communication. Accordingly, proponents of a Gricean pragmatics-first 
approach to the evolution of language have a very restrictive conception of the rel-
evance of forms of animal communication to our understanding of the emergence 
of linguistic communication. To have such relevance, a form of animal communica-
tion would have to rely on at least some capacity for Gricean mindreading. It would 
have to be shown that the nonhuman producers issue signals ostensively, with cer-
tain kinds of audience-directed communicative intentions, and that their nonhuman 
receivers make inferences about those intentions when interpreting the signals. (See, 
inter alia, Origgi & Sperber 2000, Burling 2005, Hurford 2007, Tomasello 2008, 
Fitch 2010, and Scott-Phillips 2015.). Clearly, even if it is accepted that call receiv-
ers have a capacity to extract rich information from signals, it does not follow that 
their doing so depends on their employment of Gricean mindreading. After all, ani-
mals could exercise that capacity in processing non-communicative natural signs, 
which–by their nature–in no way involve speaker meaning or its attribution. The 
5 Although Grice himself may well not have been committed to the ‘psychological reality’ of his pro-
posed analysis, proponents of a Gricean pragmatics-first approach deploy the Gricean conception pre-
cisely to extract cognitive requirements that would have to be met by any legitimate precursor of human 
linguistic communication. (For relevant discussion, see Bar-On 1995, 2013.).
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exercise of an ability for (some) context-dependent interpretation of, say, alarm calls 
is consistent with the calls’ being produced and interpreted as purely natural signs of 
the threats, so (by Gricean lights) can have no specific relevance to the emergence of 
linguistic communication.
The Carnapian and the Gricean conceptions of pragmatics can thus be seen to 
have very different implications for the relevance of behaviors such as primate alarm 
calls to the study of language evolution. On the Carnapian conception, primates’ 
communication via calls would indeed be relevant to the evolution of language, sim-
ply in virtue of the (narrow) context-dependence of calls’ content and interpreta-
tion. But, by the same token, so would any form of context-dependent interpreta-
tion, including animals’ ubiquitous interpretation of natural signs. This means that 
a Carnapian pragmatics-first approach would set an explanatory bar that is too low. 
By contrast, on the Gricean conception, establishing the evolutionary relevance of 
primate calls would require showing pragmatic continuities as understood by the 
Gricean conception. Insofar as animals do not exhibit a capacity for ostensive-infer-
ential communication, their use of calls and other signals can be no more relevant to 
the evolution of human linguistic communication than any other forms of non-mind-
reading contextual decoding of signals, natural signs included. But this means that a 
Gricean pragmatics-first approach sets an explanatory bar that is too high.
That the Gricean approach yields implausibly strong requirements can be read-
ily appreciated by considering the linguistic communication of young children. It 
is generally accepted that the sort of mindreading tasks involved in producing and 
processing utterances with Gricean meaning are too cognitively taxing for children 
under the age of 4 or 5–an age at which they already engage in rather sophisticated 
forms of linguistic communication. (See, e.g., Breheny 2006.) Adopting a Gricean 
pragmatics-first approach to the evolution of language would likewise appear to set 
an impossible standard; for, it implies that our ancestors would have had to engage in 
Gricean communication before language could begin to emerge. This would present 
us with a puzzle that seems entirely of a piece with the puzzle of language evolution 
itself. This puzzle concerns the question how the psychological capacity required for 
ostensive-inferential communication–a capacity for thought that is language-like: 
viz. propositional-compositional, recursive, and metarepresentational–could have 
emerged before language. (See Bar-On 2013, 2018)
A plausible retreat for the Gricean proponent is to suggest that, even before 
engaging in properly Gricean communication, young children nevertheless exhibit 
capacities for intentional and cooperative ‘pre-’ (or ‘minimally’) Gricean’ com-
munication. And proponents of a Gricean pragmatics-first approach to the origins 
of language could similarly ‘lower the bar’, accepting that a form of non-Gricean 
nonhuman communication would be relevant to the emergence of linguistic com-
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capacities.7 Note that this would mean making room for a conception of pragmat-
ics whose scope is both narrower than that of Carnapian pragmatics and broader 
than that of Gricean pragmatics. On such an ‘intermediary’ conception of pragmat-
ics, pragmatic phenomena would include many communicative interactions that are 
not properly Gricean. At the same, they would not include all Carnapian context-
dependent uses of signals. To a first approximation, we can characterize interme-
diary pragmatics schematically, in analogy with the way we earlier characterized 
Carnapian and Gricean pragmatics, as follows:
Intermediary pragmatics–first pass
The study of communicative interactions exhibiting capacities that a. go 
beyond ‘narrow’ context-dependence, b. fall short of being ostensive-inferen-
tial, but c. exploit ‘proto’ Gricean capacities.
Many phenomena covered by Carnapian pragmatics would fall outside the scope 
of intermediary pragmatics. But intermediary pragmatics would cover many phe-
nomena that are excluded from Gricean pragmatics. In the next section, I motivate 
the need for considering a narrower range of phenomena than those covered by Car-
napian pragmatics, drawing on the work of Michael Tomasello. In Sect. 3, I explain 
how the Gricean insight informing this work can be accommodated by the anti-
Gricean, biosemantic perspective on communication associated with the work of 
Ruth Millikan. Intermediary pragmatics as I envisage it would integrate key Gricean 
and Millikanian insights. I conclude by articulating an intermediary pragmatics-first 
approach that would seek to identify legitimate psychological yet non-Gricean pre-
cursors of human linguistic communication in animal communication.
Intermediary pragmatics and communication ‘from a psychological 
point of view’
In an essay on the origins of human communication, a leading proponent of the 
Gricean view of language, Michael Tomasello (2008), argues that we humans 
engage in a form of communication that is essentially different from all paradig-
matic forms of communication “in the biological world” (2008: 13), in being osten-
sive-inferential. Humans, Tomasello says, use “communicative signals that are cho-
sen and produced … flexibly and strategically for particular social goals… adjusted 
… for particular circumstances”, and “intentional in the sense that the individual 
controls their use flexibly toward the goal of influencing” the behavior and psycho-
logical states of others; they intentionally inform others “for cooperative motives”, 
attending to their audience’s psychological states and relying on their ability to infer 
their communicative intentions (2008: 13). If we are to understand how things could 
“move in the human direction”, evolutionarily speaking, we must identify the origins 
7 See, e.g., Moore (2017) and (2018). Notably, however, Moore’s ‘minimally Gricean’ communication 
is still ostensive communication; so it may still set the bar too high for a pragmatics-first approach. (And 
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of this “underlying psychological infrastructure of human cooperative communica-
tion” (2008: 9f.). Yet Tomasello thinks that this infrastructure is (almost) entirely 
absent from existing forms of animal communication.
Primate communication: minded and intentional yet not fully gricean?
Alarm calls and other “vocal displays”, Tomasello argues, fail constitute psycho-
logical communication in his sense, because of the lack of flexibility in primate 
call production: primates “do not learn to produce their vocal calls at all, and they 
have very little voluntary control over them” (2008: 16); and their vocalizations are 
“mostly very tightly tied to emotions” (2008: 17) (and compare Burling 2005, Hur-
ford 2007, and Fitch 2010.) Tomasello then goes on to propose that the gestures of 
nonhuman primates may be “the best place to look for the evolutionary roots” of 
human communication (2008: 15), since in the gestural domain there are hints of 
what he describes as ‘communication from a psychological point of view’: behav-
iors that involve producers who attempt to convey a message by trying to “influence 
the behavior or psychological states of recipients intentionally” (2008: 14, emphasis 
added). As an example of such behaviors in our closest relatives, the great apes, 
Tomasello considers the use of so-called attention-getters by chimpanzees, which 
include distinctive patterns of gestural, postural, and facial expressions (including 
ground-slap, poke-at, and throw-stuff, ‘play face and posture’ displays, and ‘leaf-
clipping’ noises). (A prototypical example is that of a young chimpanzee produc-
ing a gesture to draw attention to her playful facial expression and posture; 2008: 
27.) On Tomasello’s analysis, in instances of attention-getting, the significance of 
the complete communicative act does not reside in the attention-getting gesture 
itself. Rather, the gesture’s function is to draw the receiver’s attention to a behavioral 
display put on by the producers. In order to react appropriately, the recipient must 
attend to the gesture (2008: 27–8).8 The use of attention-getters is flexible: once in 
an individual’s repertoire, the individual can use them to accomplish a wide array of 
social goals, such as play, grooming, nursing, and so on (ibid.). Importantly, the use 
of attention-getters exhibits a ‘two-tiered’ structure; it is (as I shall put it) psycho-
logically mediated:
“[The] communicator has some action he wants from the recipient … and to 
attain this he attempts to draw the recipient’s attention to something…”. [This] 
indirectness [represents a] genuine evolutionary novelty–almost certainly con-
fined to great apes and perhaps other primates–and may be considered the 
closest thing we have to a ‘missing link’ between nonhuman primate com-
munication and … human referential [ostensive-inferential] communication.” 
(2008: 29).
8 He adds: “Evidence for this interpretation is that on some occasions apes will actually hide a display 
from others, for example, covering up a facial fear-grimace display with their hands” (ibid.).
 An anonymous referee has pointed out, however, that some researchers (e.g. Hobaiter and Byrne 2014) 
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Now, as I read him, Tomasello does not think great apes are capable of fully 
rational, ostensive-inferential communication. Still, he himself is prepared to regard 
at least some of their communicative behaviors as providing a potential evolution-
ary ‘missing link’ and thus as relevant to the emergence of linguistic communica-
tion, precisely because they exhibit the psychological mediation essential to the lat-
ter. This suggests that we ought to separate two main strands that are intertwined in 
Tomasello’s Gricean conception of human communication. Gricean communication 
is, first, intentional and minded communication: it depends for its success on com-
municators attending–and intentionally adjusting their communicative behavior–to 
each other’s mutually recognized states of mind. It thus exhibits a rather specific 
type of context-dependence: mind-dependent context-dependence (as I shall put it). 
But, secondly, Gricean communication is ostensive-inferential: it involves the pro-
duction of utterances with overt intentions to affect the audience states of mind, rely-
ing on the audience’s ability to reflect on the producer’s intentions (and other states 
of mind).9 As Tomasello himself seems to accept, communication can go beyond 
mere Carnapian narrow context-dependence in being intentional and minded in the 
relevant sense without yet also being ostensive-inferential. And such ‘proto’ Gricean 
communication, it seems, could have potential significance for our understanding of 
the emergence of fully mature human linguistic communication (whether in ontog-
eny or phylogeny) even from a Gricean perspective. In this way, I think Tomasello’s 
discussion opens up space for an intermediary conception of pragmatics which 
covers forms of communication that are intentional and minded though not fully 
Gricean. Thus:
Intermediary pragmatics–Gricean take
The study of psychologically mediated communicative uses of signals: the 
production and apprehension of signals that have intersubjectively recognized 
communicative purposes, and that depend for their success on animals’ recog-
nition of each other’s states of mind.
This conception is intermediary, insofar as it covers many instances of communi-
cation that fall short of being ostensive-inferential, while excluding all forms of Car-
napian context-dependent interpretation that fails to be psychologically mediated.10
9 We could also separate a third strand: the idea that what meaningful signs standardly or conventionally 
mean is ultimately dependent upon what speakers mean by them. (For some discussion and references, 
see Bar-On 1995).
10 Moore’s (2018) ‘minimally Gricean’ communicators are still said to engage in ostensive-inferential 
communication. They produce utterances with ‘overt’ (i.e., ostensive) ‘communicative intent’; and their 
receivers attribute intentions to producers and to make inferences about their mental states. It is just 
that Moore thinks this becomes less cognitively demanding once we abandon Grice’s ‘third-clause’ on 
speaker meaning, with its fourth-order meta-representations (2018: 8f.) (something that had already been 
advocated by Neale 1992; and see also, e.g., Sperber & Wilson 2015). By contrast, the intermediary con-
ception I propose below would allow us to divorce the origins of meaningful communication from the 
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Psychologically mediated communication: signal repertoires versus signal uses
As mentioned earlier, Tomasello thinks that psychologically mediated communica-
tion is not only likely confined to the great apes; it is also limited to their gestural 
communication, which he takes to contrast sharply with all communication via 
unlearned calls. Production in primate vocalizations is said to be completely inflexi-
ble and constitute ‘individualistic expressions of emotions’, as opposed to ‘recipient-
directed acts’; consequently, “vocal displays, with their genetically fixed and highly 
inflexible structure, would seem to be a very long way from human-style commu-
nication” (2008: 18–20). Thus, on Tomasello’s view, precious few existing forms 
of animal communication would fall under the scope of intermediary pragmatics as 
just characterized.
However, I believe Tomasello’s position here fails properly to draw an important 
distinction: between signal repertoires, on the one hand, and the way animals make 
use of them in communicative episodes, on the other. Primate call repertoires–under-
stood as distinct patterns of vocalization–may well be unlearned and perhaps have 
acoustic and informational structure that is genetically fixed and inflexible. But from 
this it does not follow that primates’ use of their innate calls–what they do when 
producing and interpreting calls in communicative episodes–fails to exhibit some 
psychological continuity with aspects of human linguistic communication. More 
specifically, whether or not primates’ call use is psychologically mediated in the rel-
evant sense cannot be settled by determining the etiology and structure of the calls, 
understood as elements in a system (the signal repertoire), or even whether they are 
issued as ‘expressions of emotions’. It depends, rather, on whether primates’ produc-
tion and reception of calls essentially relies on their recognition of each other’s states 
of mind (such as attention, intentions, or various affective states). It is in principle 
possible for communicators to produce and interpret elements of unlearned, limited, 
constrained, and expressive repertoires in relevantly flexible ways. For, producers 
can be mindful of their audience’s psychological states in their use of such signals, 
and receivers can recognize the signals as addressed to them, and both can modify 
their use in light of their perception of each other’s psychological states, thereby 
manifesting a capacity for intentional and minded communication.11
Tomasello himself appears implicitly to recognize the possibility of a dissocia-
tion between features of signal repertoires and of signal use, respectively, when he 
observes that the use of the pointing gesture, which arises spontaneously in human 
11 Cheney & Seyfarth (2003), Marler (2004), and Snowdon (2008) suggest that the innate and expres-
sive or ‘emotional’ character of calls and other displays is consistent with their having at least function-
ally referential dimensions. Bar-On (2013) and (2018) argues the expressive character of calls and other 
signals is consistent with call users bringing their production under voluntary control and using them 
intentionally and mindfully.
 As an anonymous referee has remarked, those who advocate a construal of chimpanzee (or other) com-
munication as ‘intentional and minded’ need to establish that chimpanzees rely on representations of 
each other’s psychological states as opposed to their (anticipated) behaviors. On the Millikanian view 
to be proposed below (“Psychologically mediated communication: an integrated view”), this would be a 
matter to be determined by the proper function of the relevant representations. It is arguably a plausible 
hypothesis that social creatures harbor representations whose proper function is to represent each other’s 
psychological states. But, on Millikan’s view, this does not mean they have conceptual or theoretical 
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babies, already exhibits psychological mediation (2008: Ch.4). But, given this dis-
sociation, it cannot be concluded that primates (or other species) cannot make psy-
chologically mediated uses of signals purely on the basis of the fact that the sig-
nals belong to unlearned, limited, and rigidly structured repertoires. Indeed, recent 
experiments by Crockford et  al. (2012) suggest that Ugandan wild chimpanzees 
make selective and strategic use of elements of an extremely limited and innately 
constrained repertoire. When producing a snake alert call, these chimpanzee mani-
fest fine-tuned sensitivity to whether or not call receivers have themselves seen the 
snake or have previously heard the call (as well as how far away they were rela-
tive to the caller, and whether they were affiliated with the caller). What Crockford 
et al. were specifically attempting to determine is whether–and to what extent–chim-
panzee callers and receivers engage in minded and intentional (= psychologically 
mediated) communication, despite having at their disposal a very limited and rigidly 
fixed repertoire of calls.12 It remains in dispute whether the experiments are suffi-
cient to establish that chimpanzees are mindreaders who reflect on receivers’ “state 
of knowledge” (as the authors themselves suggested). But the findings do seem to 
show that call producers consult and closely monitor, specifically, others’ attention 
to a potential threat, and that call receivers tailor their movements to the location 
of a threat that is invisible to them but which they recognize to be perceived by 
the caller, carefully skirting the location; and both appear to tailor their responses 
to their apprehension of each other’s perception, level of alarm, and so on. To the 
extent that this is so, these chimpanzees’ call communication may well fall within 
the scope of intermediary pragmatics as here understood. Being psychologically 
mediated, their communication would seem to go beyond merely narrow Carnapian 
context-dependence; and, though it falls short of being properly Gricean, it should 
still be of interest to proponents of a pragmatics-first approach.
Intermediary pragmatics and biosemantics
The need for an intermediary pragmatics, we have seen, can be motivated ‘from 
above’: from a broadly Gricean perspective of the need to identify psychologically 
mediated forms of communication. I now turn to an opposing perspective associ-
ated with the work of Ruth Millikan. Millikan’s ‘biosemantic’ approach (e.g. 1989, 
2006) is designed to provide a single framework within which to account for both 
nonhuman and human communication, whereby neither need rely on ostensive-
inferential abilities. Millikan’s denial that such abilities must play an essential role 
in our understanding of even linguistic communication has led critics (e.g. Origgi 
& Sperber 2000) to object that her view treats linguistic communication on the 
code model–which suggests that it would be friendly to a Carnapian pragmatics-
first approach. However, after briefly outlining key features of Millikan’s bioseman-
tics, I explain how the need for intermediary pragmatics can also be motivated ‘from 
12 For an illuminating discussion of related experiments to show that chimpanzees meet criteria for 
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below’: from within Millikan’s anti-Gricean view. I thus conclude that an inter-
mediary pragmatics-first approach which integrates both Gricean and Millikanian 
insights would be especially suitable for the purposes of those who seek potential 
precursors of human linguistic communication in animal communication.
Millikan on natural versus intentional signs
Earlier, we noted that animal calls and other communicative signals are different 
from natural signs, such as clouds or deer-tracks, and various other physiological 
symptoms, such as sneezes or red measles spots. In their seminal work, Maynard 
Smith & Harper (2003) distinguish–within the category of animal signals–between 
cues and signals. A cue is “any feature of the world, animate or inanimate, that can 
be used by an animal as a guide to future action” (2003: 3); whereas a (communica-
tive) signal is “any act or structure which alters the behaviour of other organisms, 
which evolved because of that effect, and which is effective because the receiver’s 
response has also evolved” (ibid.). For example, the  CO2 emitted by a mammal, 
which conveys to a mosquito the location of something to bite, is a cue for the mos-
quito, but is not produced as a signal by the mammal (ibid.) (so cues are merely 
natural signs in Grice’s sense). By contrast, a funnel spider’s vibrating of its web, 
which conveys to an opponent information about the vibrating spider’s size, is a 
signal, since it presumably evolved to convey information about its size (ibid.; and 
see Ch. 1 and passim). Monkey alarm calls, social grunts and ‘chutters’, and other 
vocalizations in social animals are likewise signals in that they have been designed 
to communicate information to designated recipients (op. cit. Ch. 7).
On Maynard Smith & Harper’s analysis, what separates communicative from 
natural signs is a matter of their evolutionary history and biological purpose, rather 
than the informational content they carry or their reliability. Communicative sig-
nals, unlike natural signs, thus have what Millikan has described as proper func-
tions, where an item’s proper function is some effect that instances of the item have 
had, historically, which accounts for why the item has continued to be reproduced 
(1984: 28). On Millikan’s biosemantic account (as on Maynard Smith & Harper’s), 
the communicative character of a wide variety of animal signals–e.g. bee dances, 
octopuses’ ‘angry’ flashes, beaver danger tail splashes, alarm calls–are to be under-
stood in terms of the fact that they have evolved through a process of mutual adjust-
ments between signalers and receivers. This is something Millikan thinks animals’ 
communicative signals and human linguistic signs in fact have in common. Both 
are ‘intentional representations’, in the sense that they “are supposed to represent 
things; this is their (natural) proper function–why they continue to be produced …” 
(1984: Ch. 6). What renders both intentional in Millikan’s sense is the fact that “they 
have been ‘designed’, in accordance with human or animal purposes, or by learning 
mechanisms, or by natural selection, to be interpreted according to predetermined 
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15–16).13 And this explains another commonality Millikan finds between animal 
and human communicative signals: in contrast with natural signs, they are non-
factive–they can be false (see, e.g. Millikan 2006: Ch. 6). However, this does not 
render them nonnatural in Grice’s sense. For, although both animal  and linguistic 
communicative signals have evolved via processes that involve mutual (‘coopera-
tive’) adaptations between signalers and receivers (2006: 104f.), neither must rely 
on producers’ and interpreters’ Gricean (ostensive-inferential) mindreading abilities.
On Millikan’s account, all signs carry specific information only relative to the 
(‘local’) context in which they occur. What we earlier described as Carnapian nar-
row context-dependence is everywhere. (See her 2006: Ch.s 3 & 4, and 2017: Part 
II.) When it comes to animal signals, Millikan also notes a certain evolutionary 
continuity between intentional and natural signs; animal communicative signals 
in many cases “evolve gradually” from natural signs or ‘cues’, such as preparatory 
‘intention movements’ (2006: 103f.). Moreover, Millikan thinks that animal signals 
do not entirely  lose their character as natural signs, once they become intentional 
(in her sense).14 For an interpreter of an animal signals, the mechanism and history 
of the signals make no difference–so long as they “correlate well enough with cor-
responding world affairs within some trackable domain”; … [I]t doesn’t matter to 
the purposes of the chick whether its mother’s food call is merely a recurrent natural 
sign, or also an intentional sign” (2006: 105, 109). In other words, in general, the 
signals need not be treated by their users as communicative in order to accomplish 
their designed purposes. And, in particular, although successful communication 
often requires convergence between producers and receivers’ states of mind, it does 
not require them to think about each other’s states of mind.
Just as a gosling’s imprinting mechanism has the proper function of allowing it 
to fix on images of its mother so it can follow her, and bee dances have the proper 
function of directing fellow bees to where there is nectar, so linguistic utterances in 
the indicative mood have the proper function of producing beliefs in hearers, and 
utterances in the imperative mood have the proper function of producing in hear-
ers desires to comply.15 (Likewise for other linguistic ‘constructions’, which include 
words and phrases, as well as syntactic structures.) But serving these proper func-
tions does not require that speakers intend their hearers to form beliefs and desires 
(1984: 58); and “[i]nterpreting speech does not require making any inference or hav-
ing any beliefs … about speakers’ intentions” (1984: 62, emphasis added). Infer-
ence may well be needed to derive the contextual meaning of utterances; but–at 
least in basic cases of language use–there is no need for hearers to decipher what 
14 To be precise, it is correct animal signals (i.e., ones that map onto existing states of affairs) that 
can serve as natural signs of what they represent.
15 A complication I am here setting aside is Millikan’s claim that, unlike indicative and imperative utter-
ances, animal representations are (all or most) ‘pushmi-pullyu’ representations. (See e.g. 1995 and 2006: 
80ff. and passim. And see Bar-On (under review) for discussion).
13 Millikan’s notion of proper function covers what Maynard Smith & Harper refer to as “indices”, as 
well as “handicaps” (2003: 15). Indeed, Millikan’s 1984 account is, by design, applicable to a very wide 
range of biological representational devices, including e.g., the magnetosomes that guide certain bacteria 
to oxygen-poor waters by directing them to magnetic north (2006: 82), as well as signals produced and 















































    








Journal : SmallExtended 10539 Article No : 9824 Pages : 26 MS Code : 9824 Dispatch : 27-9-2021
 D. Bar-On 
1 3
_####_ Page 14 of 26
the speaker is ‘trying to say’, or what is ‘on her mind’.16 What is more, even “con-
ventional human signs”, when “used for their conventional purposes … usually are 
read the same way that natural signs are read” (2006: 109, emphasis added). Such 
linguistic signs can serve their proper function without their producers or receiv-
ers recognizing their proper function or being aware of the processes that have ‘sta-
bilized’ them into conventional signs. So, for example, if I hear the doorbell and 
say to you: “There’s someone at the door”, I do not need to have–and you don’t 
need to recognize–a Gricean intention concerning your belief in order for my utter-
ance successfully to communicate to you what it is conventionally designed to com-
municate (i.e., what historically accounts for the proliferation of utterances of that 
type), namely: that there is someone at the door. Millikan would thus deny that the 
communicative-intentional (in her sense of ‘intentional’) character of even linguis-
tic signals normally depends on the presence and attribution of Gricean intentions. 
Although she agrees that we do, sometimes, need to consider speakers’ intentions 
when interpreting their communicative acts. For example, the interpretation of com-
pletely innovative uses of language may require considering the producer’s inten-
tions. (For relevant discussion, see, e.g., her 2006: esp. 107f. and 131ff., and 2017: 
Chapters 12, 13, esp. pp.174ff.).
This aspect of Millikan’s view puts it directly at odds with views that take 
Gricean mindreading to be not only uniquely but also essentially involved in linguis-
tic communication. It has led critics to argue that her account purchases continuities 
between human and nonhuman communication at the cost of inappropriately apply-
ing a ‘code model’ to both. (See Origgi & Sperber 2000.) On a standard construal of 
the code model, senders produce signals that encode (context-dependent) messages, 
which receivers then contextually decode, where the mechanisms for pairing sig-
nals with messages are reflexive/automatic or sub-personal, or else–if they involve 
learning–are purely associative. (See, e.g., Scott-Phillips 2015: 5, 157.) Although 
at least some Griceans (e.g., Origgi & Sperber, Scott-Phillips) believe the code 
model is perfectly suitable for understanding all animal communication, they think 
it is entirely inadequate when it comes to human linguistic communication. Humans 
regularly communicate successfully using sounds and gestures that do not have pre-
existing conventional (‘encoded’) meanings. But, moreover, successful linguistic 
communication typically goes beyond conventional meanings; it essentially exploits 
our distinctive capacity for ostensive-inferential mindreading. And these authors 
think this has direct evolutionary implications: any explanation of the evolution of 
linguistic communication must suppose that “language as we know it developed as 
an adaptation in a species already involved in [ostensive-] inferential communica-
tion, and therefore already capable of some serious degree of mindreading” (Origgi 
& Sperber 2000: 159, emphasis added).17
16 Millikan’s claim here should only be taken to imply that thinking about others’ mental states is not 
essential to the use of meaningful language, and, by implication, would not have had to precede the 
emergence of language.
17 As noted earlier (Sect. 1), this means that a post-Gricean account of the emergence of linguistic com-
munication would incur a problematic burden: to provide an evolutionary explanation of some of the 
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Psychologically mediated communication: an integrated view
Now, suppose we were to deny–with Millikan–that ostensive-inferential Gricean 
mindreading is any more essential to linguistic communication than it is essential 
to all nonhuman communication. Suppose, moreover, we were to accept that animal 
signals and even conventional linguistic signs (at least in some of their uses)  can 
be treated as natural signs. Does this obviate all need for intermediary pragmat-
ics that would cover mind-dependent context-dependent communication? In other 
words, does accepting Millikan’s biosemantic framework mean there is no need to 
go beyond Carnapian pragmatics? What I want to argue next is that, appearances to 
the contrary, we ought to, and also can–by Millikan’s own lights–accommodate the 
Gricean insight regarding psychological mediation used here to motivate intermedi-
ary pragmatics.
Let us return to the distinction drawn earlier between signal repertoires and the 
ways signals are used by producers and receivers (2.2). I think we should agree 
with Millikan that (genuinely) communicative signals possessed of proper func-
tions may nevertheless be produced and interpreted as natural signs of the states of 
affairs they represent (when correct). But note, too, that–as Griceans often observe 
(see e.g. Grice 1989)–a sign with natural meaning can be used intentionally and 
even ostensively to communicate a certain message and be interpreted as such. As 
Tomasello notes, a communicative gesture with a content that is unlearned and 
unstructured–such as pointing–can be modified and adjusted by a child depending 
on her audience and used flexibly to communicate variable messages. More gen-
erally, the way producers and interpreters use communicative signals is relatively 
independent of whether the signals, as elements in a repertoire, have acquired their 
content naturally, or rather via a learning process of mutual adjustments. It is also 
independent of whether the elements are unlearned or conventional, what informa-
tional content they have, as well as whether or not they have a Millikanian proper 
function. Whether communicators use signals in ways that go beyond narrow Carna-
pian context-dependent, whether or not they only engage in coded communication, 
is not something that can be decided just by studying the properties of elements of 
signal repertoires and their history in abstraction from their use in communication. 
It requires examining more directly the psychological aspects of their use in given 
situations.
Accepting the Gricean insight derived from Tomasello’s discussion, what is of 
special interest for our purposes is the possibility that unlearned and rigidly struc-
tured animal signals whose content is fixed by their proper function may neverthe-
less be used in psychologically mediated ways. We can capture this possibility, I sub-
mit, while preserving key elements of Millikan’s biosemantic view. Distinguishing 
distal from proximal functions of communicative signals, I propose the following:
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Psychologically mediated communication (a Biosemantic Take)
In a given species, the accomplishment of the proper function of signals with 
given representational contents may essentially rely on users’ apprehend-
ing and responding to features of each other’s psychological states–what they 
are attending or reacting to, where they are heading, what they intend to do, 
whether they are angry, playful, scared, and so on. If so, then we may say that, 
in that species, the signals’ distal proper function is accomplished through the 
fulfillment of a more proximal–and mind-dependent–proper function.
The signal’s distal proper function is itself not essentially mind-dependent; it is 
whatever beneficial effects for signalers and receivers that explain why elements of 
call systems have emerged and continue to exist. The signal’s proximal proper func-
tion would be mind-dependent inasmuch as its accomplishment would rely on com-
municators’ evolved capacity for a certain kind of psychological give and take, of a 
sort that is absent from fully coded communication.
Let me first illustrate what I have in mind in terms of Millikan’s own characteri-
zation of certain linguistic phenomena.18 As noted earlier (3.1), Millikan holds that 
what are in fact conventional linguistic signs may be treated as natural signs, rather 
than as intentionally produced communicative signals. However, when it comes to 
devices such as the demonstrative “this”, her account seems rather different. When 
using such devices, she notes, language speakers rely on non-conventional, “impro-
visational” techniques or methods: “[g]esturing toward something, pointedly look-
ing at it, nodding toward it, …. Rolling one’s eyes toward it, … are common ways 
to assure that one’s hearer will think of the right thing”. In other words, the use of 
such devices appears mind-dependent (in our sense). Now, on traditional pragmatic 
accounts, this renders the acquisition and use of demonstratives (and indexicals such 
as “you”, “he”) difficult. Indeed, Griceans often cite our regular success in com-
municating via such linguistic ‘pointing’ devices as evidence for the use of Gricean 
mindreading capacities in linguistic communication (see, e.g., Tomasello 2008: 
57ff.). Millikan disagrees. For, she thinks that, on the contrary, demonstratives “are 
among the most primitive of signs” (2006: 153). Demonstratives such as ‘this’ are 
different from conventional signs in having no specific referential content that they 
have been designed to convey (1984: 168). Instead, “‘this’ appears to be a peculiar 
sort of free variable–a place holder for something the speaker has in mind and that 
the hearer will easily gather … as what the speaker means”. It only ‘protorefers’, and 
what it refers to “must be improvised”. In general, “improvised signs do not them-
selves have referents … What they mean is, just, what the improviser intends them 
to mean” (1984: 166f.).19 But even linguistic signs that have some conventional 
meaning exhibit this feature: to “know which John is meant when somebody says 
18 In the next section, I provide some possible illustrations from existing forms of animal communica-
tion.
19 See Millikan (1984: Ch. 10) for the relevant notion of improvisation in connection with the analysis of 
indexicals. Millikan discusses the main implications of her view for the acquisition of language in, e.g., 
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‘John’… you may have to take into account with whom the speaker is acquainted, 
… or what general domain he or she has in mental focus…” (2006: 131). The same 
applies to knowing which dog is intended when one uses the definite description 
“the dog” to refer to a particular dog (2006: 127f.).
What this suggests is that, on Millikan’s own account, successful referential com-
munication via certain linguistic devices may not only be independent of convention 
and heavily context-dependent; it may also essentially rely on users’ abilities to track 
and recognize each other’s states of mind. These are mind-dependent abilities–to 
disclose and apprehend aspects of what communicators have in mind. As I would 
put it: In the case of certain linguistic devices, the distal (referential) proper func-
tion–to pick out some relevant item of interest in the world–is to be accomplished by 
fulfilling a more proximal, mind-dependent function: to draw the hearer’s attention 
to what the speaker has in mind.
Does this not take us back to a Gricean (ostensive-inferential) view of linguistic 
communication? Doesn’t acknowledging mind-dependent aspects of communication 
necessarily re-introduce the idea that speakers and hearers must be thinking about 
each other’s mind when communicating? Millikan thinks it does not–correctly, I 
believe. She says:
“[I]f you understand the phrase ‘understand what the speaker intends to com-
municate’ transparently, it does not imply that the hearer thinks about the mind 
of the speaker at all. It describes the content of the hearer’s understanding, 
but not necessarily by using a description of that content that the hearer her-
self would employ or understand (…) It means, merely, that the hearer thinks 
the same content that the speaker purposefully communicates … no thoughts 
about other people’s minds are necessary in order to grasp their meanings dur-
ing ordinary communication … (2006: 131).” (And compare Recanati (2002: 
113).
Unlike genuinely coded communication, successful linguistic communication 
often does require communicators to be able to draw each other’s attention to what 
they are attending to, and more generally, to know what is on each other’s mind. But 
that does not mean that speakers and hearers must be able to think about each oth-
er’s thoughts and other states of mind, or have intentions, beliefs, or desires directed 
at those states. Put differently, the enabling conditions for successful mind-depend-
ent communication may include communicators’ ability to see what others see, or 
hear what they hear, or notice what they notice (as well as recognize each other’s 
other states of mind). But the ‘methods’ or ‘techniques’–the underlying psychologi-
cal mechanisms–used in accomplishing such psychological coordination need not 
involve representing others’ mental states as such, attributing specific communica-
tive intentions, beliefs, and desires, or having beliefs about those states–where this, 
in turn, is taken to require having conceptual understanding of mental states. And, 
moreover, the goals of such communication in no way need to include coming to 
understand, or know about, what is on others’ mind. Of course, it is consistent with 
this claim that more sophisticated human communicators sometimes do employ 
such metarepresentational attributions and engage in fully ostensive-inferential 
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ostensive-inferential communication is necessary for the emergence of linguistic 
communication, as Griceans maintain. Millikan would deny that it is. If she is right, 
this opens up the possibility that the capacity for fully Gricean, ostensive-inferential 
communication is parasitic on linguistic capacities and that the former cannot pre-
cede the latter in either phylogeny or ontogeny.20
Millikan notes in this connection a mistaken assumption that has driven contem-
porary debates concerning whether animals and young children possess a ‘theory of 
mind’. This is the assumption
“that to represent a mental state … requires knowing certain things about what 
it is… [so] must involve knowing things that our current theories take to be 
definitive of mental states. In particular … one would recognize that another 
individual harboured a false belief and could predict their behaviour accord-
ingly.” (2017: 104).
Millikan thinks it is a mistake to suppose “that recognizing another’s mental 
states requires having a theory of mind … [t]hat “a ‘theory’ would be required for 
awareness of another’s mental states” (2017: 103), so that, for example, for an infant 
to learn to look where a parent looks when she says “See that doggie?” the infant 
would have to “employ … concepts of mental states “ and “understand the innards 
of minds” (2006: 133).
As an antidote to the familiar ‘theory’-theory construal of mindreading, Millikan 
proposes that recognition of mental states “might involve merely affording knowl-
edge rather than factic knowledge” (2017: 104, emphasis added). To have afford-
ing knowledge of, say, another’s mental state, one does not need to possess factual 
information about–or any theoretical understanding of–what states of that type are. 
One does not need to possess ‘factic’ beliefs about the state as such, or to have a 
concept of the state (as traditionally understood). One only needs to have a kind of 
practical knowledge: an ability to “recognize [the state] in some way or ways so as 
either to collect information about it or to learn how to deal with it” (op. cit.). For 
example, a dog can “perceive, and thus represent” what is, in reality, a squirrel’s 
intention to escape up a tree. The dog can learn different ways of recognizing when 
a squirrel intends to escape. But, says Millikan, “[t]he dog no more needs to grasp 
the true nature of squirrel intentions in order to represent and take account of them 
than you or he needs to grasp the true nature of water–…–in order to represent it” 
(2017:106).21
20 Relevant here are arguments by e.g. de Villiers (2000) for the developmental dependence of the rel-
evant metarepresentational and conceptual capacities on the mastery of certain linguistic structures.
21 Clearly much more needs to be said about the nature of the dog’s representation of the squirrel’s 
intention and, more generally, about the possibility of representing mental states without having concepts 
of–or beliefs about–them. For Millikan, this possibility requires understanding the role of pushmi-pullyu 
representations (mentioned in footnote 15) in animal cognition as combined with the deployment of what 
in her (2017) she dubs ‘unicepts’. For relevant discussion, see her (1995), (2017: 7.6 and passim), and 
(2006: esp. Part IV).
 Millikan’s view on these matters departs from tradition in a number of important ways. But in the pre-
sent context, the main point that bears emphasis is this. By seeking to establish whether or not infants 
and nonhuman animals possess a theory of mind (and by taking the representation of mental states to 
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Putting together Tomasello’s Gricean insight with key elements in Millikan’s 
anti-Gricean view, we can arrive at what I take to be a plausible and genuinely inter-
mediary pragmatics-first approach. Unlike Gricean approaches, this intermediary 
approach would not limit its attention to communicators who can have informed 
beliefs about mental states, or possess conceptual or theoretical understanding of 
what having such states amounts to. It would study any aspects of animals’ use of 
calls or other communicative signals that rely on animals’ capacity to ‘perceive, 
and thus represent’ each other’s states of mind. Arguably, many animals exhibit this 
capacity in their uptake of expressive behavior–behavior that is designed openly to 
show psychological states, and thus enables non-inferential perception or recogni-
tion of those states (in the sense of Recanati 2002; Millikan 1984, 2006, 2017; see 
Bar-On 2013, 2018, Arnold & Bar-On 2020). Communication that exploits such 
a psychological capacity would be, in my sense, mind-dependent without being 
theory-of-mind-dependent. Coded communication does not exploit such a capac-
ity; animals whose communication involves purely encoding and decoding signals 
have no need to rely on psychological mediation. When it comes to coded commu-
nication, the derivation of the contents of signals is accomplished automatically, or 
reflexively, or through associative learning.22
In contrast with coded communication, when it comes to psychologically medi-
ated communication, the accomplishment of the (distal) communicative function of 
signals essentially relies on the accomplishment of a more proximal psychological 
function. Thus:
Intermediary pragmatics–a synthesis
The study of communicative devices whose distal proper function is designed 
to be accomplished via the fulfillment of a proximal psychological function: 
devices whose uses are psychologically mediated, in that they rely on pro-
ducers’ and receivers’ sensitivities to–or recognition of–each other’s states of 
mind and a non-theoretical ability to represent those states.
In keeping with the Gricean insight, explaining the emergence of linguistic com-
munication requires explaining the emergence of psychologically mediated com-
munication. The latter would represent an evolutionary innovation relative to coded 
communication. On my proposed account, this innovation would have appeared on 
the evolutionary scene when our nonhuman ancestors, who already had the capac-
ity for openly showing and non-inferentially perceiving each other’s psychological 
22 Recently, Scarantino has suggested that we can think of what animals do with emotion expressions 
(including alarm calls) in terms of “analogs” of Austinian speech acts. However, Scarantino himself pre-
sents his ‘theory of affective pragmatics’ as “pragmatic in the Carnapian sense only: It aims to capture 
how the meaning of emotional expressions depends [narrowly] on their context of production…” (2017: 
217, emphasis added). It is thus consistent with his view that expressive communication is fully coded 
communication.
tation of mental states standards that many in philosophy of language and mind believe we should not 
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states, began to harness this capacity to enhance or modify their use of communica-
tive signals.
Intermediary pragmatics: how to do things with nonwords
One implication of the foregoing discussion is that advocates of pragmatics-first 
approaches should not assume from the outset that nonhuman-human communica-
tive continuities depend, specifically, on whatever similarities can be found between 
animal signals and natural language discrete words or phrases that encode symbolic, 
conventional meanings. As the above discussion of linguistic devices such as “this” 
illustrates, improvisation most clearly plays an indispensable role when it comes to 
communication via expressions that do not have fixed symbolic-conventional con-
tent. It can also play a crucial role when it comes to expressions that have highly 
open-ended, situation-specific content–e.g., indexicals such as “here” and “there”, 
exclamatives (e.g. “wow! “, “yay!”, “hey!”, and also “psst” or “shh”), expletives 
(e.g. “dammit!”), but also, inter alia, proper names and definite descriptions–devices 
whose successful use in communication depends, at a minimum, on communicators’ 
ability to attract, gauge, and modify each other’s attention to specific features of the 
given situation. Indeed, on one influential view of language evolution, due to lin-
guist Ray Jackendoff (2002), a subset of these sorts of non-symbolic devices, which 
carry no or limited encoded meanings, constitute present-day linguistic “fossils” of 
Protolanguage: a hypothetical intermediate stage in the evolution of language from 
animal communication. What would have rendered Protolanguage an intermediate 
stage in our ancestors’ journey to language is the fact that it would have consisted 
exclusively of a small repertoire of non-symbolic devices–holophrastic elements, 
with very minimal semantics and no syntax (as exemplified by the fossils) (2002: 
235ff.).23 If the intermediary pragmatics-first approach envisaged here is on the right 
track, it could shed light on what would have rendered Protolanguage pragmati-
cally–and not only semantically–intermediate: users of Protolanguage would have 
essentially relied on their non-Gricean capacities for situation-specific psychologi-
cal give-and-take.24
On the potential evolutionary significance of ‘nonwords’
This way of understanding the contribution of my proposed intermediary pragmat-
ics-first approach to the origins of language gives rise to the following two questions:
23 See Progovac (2017) for a systematic and illuminating development of the idea of Protolanguage from 
a broadly Chomskian perspective on language.
24 A fuller discussion would, of course, need to make good on the claim made here that the relevant psy-
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 (i) What might be the evolutionary advantage of having a Protolanguage that 
works in a psychologically mediated (yet non-Gricean) way? And
 (ii) What non-Gricean capacities exhibited by extant nonhuman animals might 
have made it possible for such a Protolanguage to have emerged?
Attempting to provide full answers these questions goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. But here are some initial thoughts.
As regards (i): The survival benefits of all animal signals, we may assume, are 
just the benefits (to producers and receivers) of the receivers’ taking an action that 
is appropriate to perceived situations (avoiding predation, getting food, securing 
a mate, increasing social bonds, and so on). In social creatures that have states of 
mind (such as sensation, perception, attention, but also affective states such as fear, 
agitation, and so on), being able to recognize and spontaneously respond to various 
features of these states can be very useful, insofar as it can greatly enhance their 
ability to engage in appropriate behavior and modify it flexibly in response to chang-
ing circumstances, by allowing individuals to take advantage of each other’s states 
of mind. (It can no doubt be useful for me to recognize your fear of something that 
I myself had failed to notice, and of which I, too, should be afraid.) To put it in 
Millikanian terms, in minded creatures, others’ states of mind constitute signifi-
cant affordances. But, now, suppose this capacity for ‘minding other minds’ can be 
coopted (or ‘harnessed’) in their use of communicative signals. This would allow 
communicators to make more diverse and flexible uses of elements of their limited, 
noncombinatorial (and unlearned) repertoires, thereby significantly increasing the 
number of messages they can convey and understand. (Users of Jackendoff’s Pro-
tolanguage would have been able to convey a reasonably wide–even if by no means 
unlimited–range of situation-specific messages. Think of how many messages can 
be conveyed by pointing, for example.) Such an increase in expressive power and 
communicative agility would no doubt help animals navigate their environment, 
both physical and social. But suppose–as suggested earlier–that being attuned to key 
features of others’ states of mind, as openly displayed in some of their (expressive) 
behaviors, does not require thinking about, or attributing to others, mental states as 
such; that is, suppose it does not rely on a(n even minimally) metarepresentational 
theory of mind. Then, in contrast with narrowly context-dependent, rigidly coded, 
and ‘unminded’ communication, mind-dependent communication as described here 
could be seen to have some of the advantages of Gricean communication, yet with-
out relying on the cognitive resources required for the latter.25 To repeat, then, on 
the present proposal, the key evolutionary innovation that could have put our ances-
tors on their way to linguistic communication would have involved the coupling of 
a widespread capacity for context-dependent use of communicative signals with a 
less widespread capacity for non-theory-of-mind representation of others’ state of 
mind. It is when the latter capacity is harnessed so as to allow animals to modify and 
25 It would not even need to appeal to a capacity for ‘minimal Gricean’ communication (as described by, 
e.g., Moore (2018)–which still relies on overt communicative intentions on the part of speakers and their 
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augment the communicative function of the former that we begin to have ‘communi-
cation from a psychological point of view’.
Psychologically mediated communication in monkeys?
We can now turn to question (ii) above. As we saw earlier (2.1), there are some 
indications in current studies of chimpanzees’ use of unlearned calls that primates 
exhibit some capacity for psychologically mediated communication. But it would 
be instructive to consider whether some origins of such communication could be 
found even earlier, phylogenetically speaking. What about monkey calls, which (as 
we have seen) have been used to motivate pragmatics-first approaches–and which 
are often dismissed by Griceans as entirely irrelevant to the origins of human com-
munication? Here, again, adopting an intermediary pragmatics-first approach would 
mean establishing, at a minimum, that monkeys’ use of their unlearned calls (in 
production and reception) is not fully ‘scripted’, or dictated by monkeys’ percep-
tion of the non-social situation, and that in producing and interpreting calls monkeys 
directly rely on their perception of each other’s states of mind–that communication 
via calls involves psychological give and take as described above.
To illustrate, consider the call system of putty-nosed monkeys–an arboreal spe-
cies of monkeys belonging to the genus Cercopithecus.26 Putty-nosed males have 
a repertoire of three ‘loud’ call types that can carry over long distances: booms, 
pyows, and hacks. Booms are very rarely heard and occur in a wide range of con-
texts, whereas pyows and hacks are produced frequently. All these calls were ini-
tially thought to be functionally referential (just as the vervet alarm calls had been 
claimed to be) (Eckhardt & Zuberbühler 2004). However, in a reevaluation of 
the putty-nosed call system, Arnold & Zuberbühler (2013) argue that pyows and 
hacks–whether produced discretely or in sequences–simply do not behave like func-
tionally referential labels for distinct types of predator (2013: 1). They note that call 
series were observed to be produced in a variety of contexts that did not involve 
predators at all (2013: 2). And even when produced discretely, neither hacks nor 
pyows seemed tightly linked to the presence of specific types of predators. Instead, 
their use seems to depend on “a high degree of flexibility in both call production and 
comprehension that is absent in context-bound, though potentially more informative, 
signals”. Pyows, especially, “appear to function primarily as an attention getter” 
(2013: 5, and compare 2012: 307). Given the relatively loose, unstable relationship 
between calls and the presence of (specific types of–or any) predators, the authors 
conclude that the use of both types of calls must rely “on listeners’ abilities to inte-
grate information from a number of sources” (ibid).
Notably, Arnold & Zuberbühler observe that “listeners … attempt to acquire 
additional information about the behavior of the caller” in order to determine the 
cause or target of the call (2013: 2, emphasis added). Thus, when a putty-nosed male 
26 The following description follows Arnold & Bar-On (2020). Bar-On (under review, mentioned in 
footnote 4 above) offers a critical discussion of a contextual semantic-pragmatic analysis of putty-nosed 
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produces a pyow call, his body posture and other features of his demeanor reveal 
aspects of his state of mind–whether he is alarmed or relaxed, and, if alarmed, how 
alarmed he is, what he is alarmed by, what his attention is directed at, and how he 
is preparing to act next. Upon hearing his call, other group members within sight 
can be observed to actively attempt to find out more about his state in order to learn 
what the male was calling about, rather than immediately reacting by reflexively 
engaging in a fixed pattern of anti-predator behavior. If females with visual access 
observe the male’s alert body posture and his gaze as fixated on the threat, they 
will subsequently chime in with their own chirp calls. And other group members 
who lack visual access to the male appear to be alerted to the threat upon hear-
ing female chirp calls that accompany the male calls. Only then do they approach 
the threat and begin calling and mobbing. All in all, what Arnold & Zuberbühler 
seem to describe is an intricate and highly dynamic pattern of ‘division of commu-
nicative labor’ surrounding the putty-nosed monkey intragroup calling behavior.27 
Determining whether this description is correct would require more careful analysis. 
But if it is, this would suggest that the communicative work of at least some monkey 
call systems goes beyond the integration of environmental cues, general background 
knowledge, and context-dependent information that is tightly associated with innate 
call types. It relies crucially on monkeys’ recognition and uptake of multiple psy-
chological aspects of the calling situation (as openly shown in monkeys’ expressive 
behaviors). In that case, putty-nosed monkeys’ use of calls, too, would fall under the 
scope of intermediary pragmatics as presented here.
***
In this paper, I have argued that, if we are to identify potential precursors of 
human linguistic communication in animal communication, we ought to adopt 
a genuinely intermediary pragmatics-first approach. Doing so, I have suggested, 
means looking beyond the Carnapian narrow context-dependence of the informa-
tional content of animals’ communicative signals, as well as beyond their Millika-
nian distal proper function. In keeping with the Gricean insight concerning com-
munication ‘from a psychological point of view’, this requires investigating the 
extent to which the relevant forms of communication exploit a capacity for mind-
dependent context-dependent uses of signals. Such uses would resemble and poten-
tially foreshadow what Millikan describes as ‘improvisational’ uses of non-symbolic 
linguistic devices. An intermediary pragmatics-first investigation could help shed 
light on the emergence of linguistic communication by bringing into view a way of 
reconceiving the puzzle of the evolution of language. In approaching the puzzle, we 
should not be asking, in the first place: How could metarepresentational ostensive-
inferential communication have emerged from merely coded animal communica-
tion? We should instead be asking: How could animals’ psychological capacity for 
non-Gricean recognition of each other’s states of mind come to be harnessed so as 
to enable psychologically mediated uses of communicative signals? Initially posing 
27 A different–though potentially compatible–‘dynamic’ construal of monkey calls (utilizing Stalnaker’s 
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our question in this way would, I believe, open up promising new directions in the 
study of animal communication and the evolution of linguistic communication.
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